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1. SCOPE and PURPOSE 
The scope of this document includes radiation safety considerations used in the design of 
facilities for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project (YMP). The purpose of the 
Repository Radiation Shielding Design Guide is to document the approach used in the 
radiological design of the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) surface and subsurface 
facilities for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. This document is 
intended to ensure that a common methodology is used by all groups that may be involved 
with Radiological Design. This document will also assist in ensuring the long term 
survivability of the information basis used for radiological safety design and will assist in 
satisfying the documentation requirements of the licensing body, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). 
This design guide provides referenceable information that is current and maintained under 
the YMP Quality Assurance (QA) Program. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with 
maintaining continuity in spite of a changing design environment. This approach also serves 
to ensure common inter-disciplinary interpretation and application of data. 
2. APPLICABILITY 
This Guide applies to the radiological design of the repository surface and subsurface 
facilities. The initial focus of the guide is on radiation shielding for workers and members 
of the public as well as for critical equipment which may be exposed to radiation. Later 
issues of this guide will include additional radiological design issues such as instrumentation, 
radiation effects on materials, and dosimetry. Radiation sources used in this Guide are based 
on commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF), including pressurized water reactor (PWR) and 
boiling water reactor (BWR), and on Defense High Level Waste (DHLW). Not included at 
this time are the various forms of Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/SNF) that 
are being considered for inclusion in the repository. 
3. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This document serves as a guide for the performance of calculations affecting radiological 
aspects of health and safety. Although, the classification of permanent items described in 
QAP-2-3 Classification of Permanent Items has not been performed for the Structures, 
Systems and Components (SSCs) applicable to this Radiation Safety Design Guide, an 
activity evaluation has been performed in accordance with procedure QAP-2-0 and has 
determined that the activities addressed in this Guide are subject to the requirements of the 
Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (QARD)(Reference 7.1 ), because this 
Guide affects items on the Q-List (Reference 7.25). However, since this Guide will not be 
used for procurement, fabrication, or construction, any assumptions identified do not need 
to be marked TBV or tracked in accordance with appropriate QA procedures. 
1 
I 
This classification of SSC’s described in QAP-2-3 will be performed in the future apart from 
this Design Guide. 
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4. DESIGN INPUTS 
A number of the design inputs used in Radiological Design are documented in the following 
sections. These are representative of the type and pedigree of information used and are not 
exhaustive. Additional resources may be needed to address a particular problem. 
To the extent practical, project-maintained documents are used for design inputs to shielding 
calculations. Included are such documents as the Controlled Design Assumptions Document 
(CDA), Reference 7.3, the Repository Design Requirements Document (RDRD), Reference 
7.4, and the Engineered Barrier Design Requirements Documents (EBDRD), Reference 7.5. 
Alternatively, use is made of data sources from referable sources with demonstrated 
acceptance from a NRC regulatory perspective whenever such data are required that is not 
otherwise available from project-maintained documents. 
4.1 DESIGN PARAMETERS 
4.1.1 Radiation Source Terms 
The radiation source terms used in radiological design are, to the extent possible, based on 
the Characteristic Data Base (CDB), Reference 7.6 as used in the CDA Document, Reference 
7.3, assumption EBDRD 3.2.3.4.C.4. The CDB is currently available as a computer code 
information database. Output from the CDB includes detailed burnup data in the form of 
isotopic composition of spent nuclear fuel. Additionally, the CDB calculates both the 
gamma and neutron source components of the overall radiation field which emanates from 
either SNF or D E W .  The strength and spectra of such radiation fields are dependent upon 
several parameters including initial enrichment, initial fuel loading, irradiation burnup 
history, decay time, and the specifics of fuel type. In the case of SNF, the fuel type may be 
either PWR or BWR based designs. The CDB, which is based on a number of calculations 
using the ORIGEN2 code, Reference 7.7, provides a ready reference for selected parameter 
values. A variant of thls code has also been incorporated into the SCALE 4.3(see Ref. 7.8) 
system of computer codes. 
I 
I 
Depending upon the application and goals, different parameter values may be selected for 
the radiation source terms. Examples of the possible variety are noted as follows: 
The Design Basis Fuel (DBF) as defined in this report is for shielding calculations and has 
been derived from the Advanced Conceptual Design (ACD) Report(Ref. 7.24). This is not 
necessarily the same as the Design Basis Fuel as used in other analysis for thermal or 
criticality calculations. 
Maximum Possible Radiation Source for ShieldinP 
The maximum radiation source from irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies is typically defined 
by the following factors: 
0 maximum fuel content, or Metric Ton Initial Heavy Metal (MTIHM) 
0 maximum burnup 
0 minimum enrichment 
0 minimum decay 
Based on current fuel designs, some PWR fuel assemblies may undergo burnup histories as 
high as 70,000 MWdMTIHM. Similarly, for BWR fuel, the burnup histories may be 
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expected to be as high as 49,000 MW~/MTIHLM. 
Fuel 
Type 
PWR 
BWR 
A survey of the different types of fuel assemblies in the CDB, Reference 7.6, indicates that 
irradiations of fuel assemblies containing a total of 1,66 I MTMM of fuel from the South 
Texas Project (STP) may contain a combination of initial fuel loading, burnup, and 
enrichment which may result in the ma?timum radiation source. The radiation from this 
source may be greater than the Advanced Conceptual Design (ACD) Design Basis Fuels 
(DBF) Radiation Source (Ref. 7.24)[discussed in the following paragraphs] by 17% based 
on initial MTMM loading alone as indicated in the analysis of Reference 7.6. 
SNF Burnup Initial Age 
Population (MWd/MTMM) Enrichment (years) 
Bounded (weight %) 
97.85% 48,086 4.2 10 
100% 49,000 3.74 10 
These fuel assemblies represent a very minor fraction of the overall total of 70.000 MTU of 
SNF expected to be emplaced in the repository. No other fuel assemblies were found to 
potentially exceed the ACD DBF Radiation Source. Furthermore, it  is unknown at this time 
if the STP assemblies will ultimately be irradiated to their maximum burnup limit. 
Consequently, the higher STP source term has not been selected for design application until 
such time as it has been determined whether this is indeed the limiting source term or 
whether such S W  cannot be accommodated by special processing; e.g., either by blending 
with lower burnup fuel or by special handling at the repository. 
Design Basis Fuel Radiation Source 
The ACD DBF have been described in Reference 7.24 to bound the majority of SNF 
expected to be received at the MGDS from a radiological and thermal standpoint. This 
bounding is based on SNF being received according to the “oldest-fuel-first” scenario. 
Moreover, as a conservative measure, it  is assumed that such SNF is received with the 
minimum decay of 10 years as stipulated in Reference 7.9. 
Note: 5 year old fuel may be received at the repository as required by 
contract. Higher radiation doses resulting from this fuel can be 
handled by operational controls. Other sources will be developed as 
required. 
These are further described in Table 4- 1 as follows: 
Initial 
Fuel 
Loading 
(MTMiM) 
0.464 
0.196 
It is assumed that derating or blending various fuel assemblies may be required to 
accommodate fuel which exceeds the ACD DBF in the previous table. Therefore use of 
the ACD DBF will provide a conservative radiation source term for shielding analysis. 
Additional information regarding radiation source terms derived from the specifications 
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for the PWR SNF is described in Attachment I. Included are detailed gamma and neutron 
source strengths and spectra for use in shielding design work. , 
~~ ~ 
Burnup 
(MWdMTMM) 
Average Radiation Source 
Initial Age 
Enrichment (years) 
(weight 5%) 
The average SNF radiation source is typically used in ALARA assessments to be as 
representative of the average of radiation conditions to be encountered. As noted in 
Reference 7.3, Key assumption 004, the average SNF may be described in Table 4.2 as 
follows: 
i 
39,750 
3 1,490 
I T 
3.72 26.4 
3.00 26.5 
~ ~~~~ ~ 
ble 4-2: Average Radiation Source 
The data of Table 4-2 is based on the oldest-fuel-first scenario with no fuel younger than 10 
years old being accepted at the repository. A further description of the gamma and neutron 
source terms for the Average radiation source term for the PWR SNF is contained in 
Attachment II. 
4.1.2 Time-Dependent Neutron Source Data 
The following time-dependent neutron source data for the PWR SNF are used to determine 
the neutron radiation field from the waste packages as a function of time for a maintainable 
preclosure service life of at least 150 years (Ref. 7.3, p. 4-1 1) after initiation of waste 
emplacement. The initial emplacement time corresponds to a decay time of 10 years as 
defined for ACD DBF. The end of the service life, therefore corresponds to a decay time of 
160 years. The data are for 4.2% initial enrichment and 48,086 MWd/MTIHM burnup 
corresponding to the ACD DBF. 
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Decay Time Time After Emplacement 
110 100 
120 110 
130 120 
140 130 
150 140 
160 150 
(Yr> (Yr> 
These parameters are used for time-dependent neutron radiation conditions. 
Neutron Source Strength 
3.28e+07 
2.80e+07 
2.46e+07 
2.2 2e+07 
2.05e+07 
1.93e+07 
( n / s  - MT M M) '
4.1.3 Time-dependent Gamma Source Data 
Attachment II provides the time-dependent gamma source data used to determine the active 
fuel gamma radiation field from the waste packages as a function of time for the 150-year 
maintainable preclosure service life (Ref. 7.3, p. 4-1 1) after initial emplacement. The initial 
emplacement time corresponds to a decay time of 10 years as defined for ACD DBF. The 
end of the maintainable preclosure service life corresponds to a decay time of 160 years. The 
data are for 4.2% initial enrichment and 45,086 MWd/MTIICM burnup. The decay times 
include those as given in Section 4.1.2 for the time-dependent neutron source data. All the 
data are reproduced from the computer output of the CDB (Ref. 7.6). 
4.1.4 CO-60 Sources in Non-fuel Components 
The upper and lower end fittings of those fuel assemblies containing stainless steel may 
contain Co-60 sources, which are due to neutron activation of non-fuel components during 
reactor operation. These sources may contribute significantly to radiation fields, however, 
the individual analyst should evaluate each specific case to determine all applicable sources. 
The following data, obtained from Reference 7.6 for PWR SNF are used to derive the Co-60 
source terms for ACD DBF and average SNF: 
Repion 
Upper End Fittings 
Gas Plenum 
Lower End Fittings 
CO-60 Activitv (Wassemblvy 
11 1.5 
57.64 
15 1 
a From Ref. 7.6, computer output for 4.73% enrichment, 60000 h.IWd/MTMM 
burnup and 10 years decay. 
These parameters are used to obtain the CO-60 generated source terms. 
An additional potential source of CO-60 not considered here is from deposits of corrosion and 
wear products which may reside on surfaces of fuel assemblies. Such deposits generally 
contain much lower amounts of (20-60 than that contained in end fittings. They are however 
a potential source of loose radioactive material which should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis in analysis as in Reference 7.23. 
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4.1.5 Material Data 
Neutron 
Energy (MeV) 
2 SOe-08 
1.00e-07 
1 .OOe-O6 
1.00e-05 
1 . OOe -04 
1.00e-33 
1.00e-02 
1 .OOe-0 1 
The material data required in radiological design analysis include the density and elemental 
isotopic composition for each material. Data used in shielding design are based on standard 
material handbooks and published YMP documents, and are consistent with those used 
throughout the project (e.g., Waste Package Development Department). The materials 
considered include those for the waste form, waste package, WP transporter, emplacement 
drift, host tuff medium, etc. Attachment IV lists the pertinent material data used in 
radiological design analysis. 
Conversion 
Factors 
(me&)/ 
(n/cm2-sec) 
3.67e-03 
3.67e-03 
4.46e-03 
4.54e-03 
4.18e-03 
3.76e-03 
3.57e-03 
2.08e-02 
4.1.6 Flux-To-Dose-Rate Conversion Factors 
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
1.00e-02 
3.00e-02 
5.00e-02 
7.00e-02 
The flux-to-dose-rate conversion factors are used to convert the calculated neutron and 
p n m a  fluxes to dose rates. These factors are based on the AiiSVANS-6.1.1- 1977 S tmdard' 
(Reference. 7.10). 
Conversion Factors 
(re&)/( photons/cm*-s) 
3.96e-06 
I Table 4- 1.6a: Neutron Flux-To-Dose-Rate Conversion Factors I 
0, p. 4)' 
Neutron 
Energy (MeV) 
5.00e-01 
l.OOe+OO 
2.50e+00 
5.00e+00 
7.00e+00 
1 .OOe+O 1 
1.40e+0 1 
2.00e+0 1 
Conversion 
Factors 
(mrem/hr)/ 
(n/cm'-sec) 
7.14e-02 
1.18e-01 
1.25e-0 1 
1 S6e-0 1 
1.47e-0 1 
1.47e-0 1 
2.08e-0 1 
2.27e-01 
The revised version of ANSVANS-6.1.1 was published 
in 199 1. The NRC has decided to defer acceptance until 
there is greater scientific consensus on the most 
appropriate values. Until such time as the 1991 standard 
is accepted, the ANSYANS-6.1.1-1977 Standard will be 
used. 
- 1 
= 2.90e-07 
2.58e-07 I 
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t 1.40e+00 I 2.51e-06 I 
4.2 CRITERIA 
The following design criteria were developed in response to the requirements found in the 
RDRD (Ref. 7.4) that specifically apply to this Design Guide. RDRD requirements are cited 
for each criteria statement. 
Occupational radiation exposures shall be maintained as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA), and within the exposure dose limits specified in 
10CFR20.1201. (RDRD 3.2.2.1.A, RDRD 3.2.2.1 .B, and RDRD 3.2.2.1.C) 
4.2.1 
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4.2.2 
4.2.3 
4.2.4 
4.2.5 
4.2.6 
For shielding design analysis, the controlling limit is. the total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE) of 5 rem per year. To meet the 5 r e d y r  limit, the shielding shall 
be designed not to exceed a dose rate of 2.5 m r e d h r  in normally occupied areas 
(based on a 40 hr/wk 50 wwyr occupational access). Higher dose rate limits may be 
allowed in intermittently occupied areas depending upon occupancy time, and 
frequency of exposure, provided that individual annual exposures are within the 5 
r e d y r  limit. 
For ALARA considerations, radiation shielding shall be designed with the goal of 
limiting the TEDE to less than 1 rem per year to workers, which is one-fifth of the 
lOCFR20.1201 annual occupational exposure limit. (RDRD 3.2.4.5.1.A. RDRD I 
3.2.4.5.1.B, RDRD 3.2.4.5.1.D) I 
The ALARA limit of 1 r e d y r  corresponds to 0.5 m r e d h r  for normally occupied 
areas based on a 40 hr/wk occupational access. Other areas requiring intermittent 
access may be designed using higher dose rate limits based on occupancy time, and 
frequency of exposure, provided that the ALARA goal of 1 r e d y r  per individual is 
met. 
This criteria statement is used for dose assessment. 
The concrete shadow shields provided near the entrances (east and west entrances) 
of each emplacement drift for radiation protection purposes shall comply with 
ANSI/ANS 6.4 and ACI 349. For other shields, ACI 3 18 is appropiate and provides 1 
adequate strength for design earthquake loads (DE)(RDRD 3.2.4.5.1 .C) I 
This criteria statement is used for specification of concrete density and material 
composition for radiation shielding analysis. 
Suitable shielding shall be provided to maintain radiation doses in restricted areas of 
the Geologic Repository Operations Areas (GROA) within the limits specified in 
10CFR2O. (RDRD 3.7.7.A) 
This criteria statement applies to the waste package transporter shielding, in-drift 
concrete shadow shields, and drift entrance doors. 
The Geologic Repository Operations Area (GROA) shall, to the extent practicable, 
be designed and constructed to use procedures and engineering controls based on 
sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to 
members of the public that are ALARA. ALARA principles shall be based on the 
applicable sections ofthe NRC Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. (RDRD 3.2.2.1.A) 
Shielding and other radiation protection measures shall be provided for areas 
requiring intermittent access, such as for preventive maintenance, component 
changes, adjustment of systems and equipment, and so forth, with the goal of limiting 
dose rates based on occupancy, time, and frequency of exposure to one rem per year. 
(RDRD 3.2.4.5.1.B) 
4.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
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4.3.1 General Assumptions from the CDA 
The following section contains relevant excerpts from the Controlled Design Assumptions 
(CDA) Document (Ref. 7.3) that apply to this Design Guide. Rationale for each of these 
assumptions is provided in Ref. 7.3. 
4.3.1.1 The average commercial spent fuel characteristics upon receipt at the 
repository are: 26.4 years old with 39,750 MWD/MTU burnup and 3.72 
wt.% enrichment (PWR) and 26.5 years old with 3 1,490 MWDfilTU burnup 
and 3.00 wt.% enrichment (BWR). (CDA Key Assumption 004) 
For this Guide, the design basis fuel is PWR Fuel and the decay time is 
changed to 26 years. Rationale for this deviation: The CDB contains the 
source data only for integer year values. Use of 26 years produces a slightly 
higher radiation source strength for shielding analysis. This assumption is 
used to specify the source data for average SNF. 
4.3.1.2 Waste packages will be emplaced in-drift in a horizontal mode. (CDA Key 
Assumption 01 1) 
4.3.1.3 Waste packages will be placed center in-drift, on pedestals, using gantry 
emplacement. (CDA Key Assumption 066) 
For shielding models, the shielding effect of pedestals and gantry equipment 
is ignored for conservatism. This assumption is used for in-drift waste 
package modeling. 
4.3.1.4 No human entry is planned in emplacement drifts while WPs are present. 
The waste emplacementhetrieval equipment may use robotics andor  remote 
control features to perform operations and monitoring within the 
emplacement drifts to avoid personnel radiation exposures. Under off-normal 
conditions, human entry will be considered if protection to workers can be 
provided such as shielding. (CDA Key Assumption 0 13) 
This assumption is used to evaluate radiation hazards to repository personnel 
and the need for personnel shielding for off-normal conditions. 
4.3.1.5 WP containment barriers will provide sufficient shielding for protection of 
WP materials from radiation enhanced corrosion. Individual WPs will not 
provide any additional shielding for personnel protection. Additional 
shielding for personnel protection will be provided on the subsurface 
transporter and in subsurface facilities. (CDA Key Assumption 03 1)  
This assumption is used to provide shielding for personnel protection. 
4.3.1.6 The following diameters (meters) are assumed for underground openings: 
(CDA Key Assumption 070) 
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4.3.1.7 
4.3.1.8 
4.3.1.9 
4.3.1.10 
4.3.1.11 
4.3.1.12 
Ramps 
AccessIService Main 
Emplacement Drift 
7.62 
7.62 
TBD 
This assumption is used to account for drift wall scattering effects in the 
waste package transporter shielding analysis. 
Inventories of radionuclides will be based on the Characteristics Data Base. 
(CDA EBDRD 3.2.3.4.C.4) 
This assumption is used to obtain all radiation source data for use in shielding 
analyses. 
Engineered Barrier Segment (EBS) structures, systems, and components shall 
be designed for a maintainable preclosure service life of at least 150 years 
following first emplacement of waste. (CDA EBDRD 3.2.5.4) 
This assumption is used for determination of time-dependent doses. 
The external dimensions of the waste package for a) commercial SNF that is 
repackaged and for b) uncanistered commercial SNF shall not exceed: (CDA 
EBDRD 3.7.1.J. 1) 
Outer Diameter: 
Outer length: 
1.85 m 
5.85 m 
These dimensions are used to establish the inside dimensions of the waste 
package transporter. 
A 35 m thermal standoff distance is used to limit the surface rock temperature 
of the adjacent main drift. The thermal standoff is defined as the 
perpendicular distance from the center of the closest emplaced waste package 
to the nearest edge of the main drift. (CDA DCSS 033) 
A 13 m radiological standoff distance is used for determining the limiting 
configuration in the evaluation of radiological dose rates in the adjacent main 
drift. The radiological standoff is defined as the distance from the center of 
the closest emplaced waste package to the door of the emplacement drift. 
This distance is equal to the sum of the distances from the doors to the edge 
of the waste package (10 m) plus half the length of the waste package 
(approximately 3 m).(CDA DCSS 033) 
Doors are required at entrances to emplacement drifts. (CDA DCSS 036) 
This assumption is used for the drift entrance door shielding analysis. 
The Surface Facilities that house radioactive materials or in which work is 
performed on radioactive materials will be designed to control occupational 
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exposures to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and less than 500 
millirem per year. (CDA DCS 003) 
4.3.1.13 As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) studies will be conducted as 
needed to establish the allowable dose rates upon which various radiological 
safety calculations will be based. (CDA DCS 004) 
4.3.2 Other Assumptions 
4.3.2.1 The dose rate limit for shielding analysis of the waste package transporter is assumed 
to be 50 mrem/hr on the general accessible surfaces of the transporter, which includes 
the sidewall and end surfaces. The dose rate limit for the bottom surface of the 
transporter where access is normally not required is assumed to be 100 mrem/hr. 
Rationale: Personnel access requirements in the vicinity of the transporter when 
loaded with a waste package have not been established. Typically, on-site transfer 
casks at nuclear power plants or other nuclear facilities were designed to a surface 
dose rate of 50 to 200 me&. For preliminary design of the waste package 
transporter, it is prudent to use the lower end of the 50 to 200 mrem/hr range, 
namely, 50 mrem/hr for the general accessible surfaces. No access is required to the 
bottom surface of the transporter for normal conditions. A higher dose rate limit is 
acceptable on this surface. The limit of 100 mrem/hr is assumed to limit the 
scattering contributions off the floor, and avoid being classified as a “high radiation 
area”. This assumption is used for the waste package transporter shielding design 
and will be the subject of an ALARA study as will any other radiological design. 
4.3.2.2 For radiation analysis of multiple waste packages in the same emplacement 
drift, any intervening waste package is assumed to be an opaque object for 
direct radiation (Le., direct contribution without scattering off Ehe drift wall), 
but transparent for scattered or albedo radiation off the drift wall. Rationale: 
This assumption is conservative to estimate the radiation dose contributions 
from multiple waste packages. The closed waste package is the principal 
contributor to the radiation fields in the main drift and turnout areas. This 
waste package will block virtually all direct radiation from other waste 
packages in the same drift, leaving the contributions arising from scattering 
off the drift wall only. This assumption ignores the presence of the 
intervening waste packages for scattered radiation off the drift wall, which 
conservatively over-estimates the scattering contributions. This assumption 
is used to estimate the radiation fields for multiple waste packages. 
4.3.2.3 The waste package loading dock at the drift entrance door is omitted in the 
emplacement drift model. Rationale: The loading dock is a concrete structure 
which would reduce contributions of radiation scattering off the bottom 
portion of the drift wall to the radiation fields in the main drift and turnout 
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areas. Ignoring this dock in the model would result in a higher dose rate, 
which is conservative for personnel protection., 
4.4 CODES AND STANDARDS 
4.4.1 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
ANSYANS 6.1.1-1977 Neutron and Gamma-Ray Fluence-to-Dose Factors, 3/ 17/77 
ANSVANS 6.1.1-1991 Neutron and Gamma-Ray Fluence-to-Dose Factors, 8/26/9 1 
ANSVANS 6.4- 1985 Guidelines on the Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete 
Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants, 3/1/85 
44.2. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
1 OCFR20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Revised as of 
J a n u q  1, 1996 
4.4.3 NRC Regulatory Guides (RG) 
RG 8.8 
RG 8.10 
Information Relevant to Ensuring That Occupational 
Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will be As 
Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALMA),  Revision 3, 
June 1978 (Second Proposed Revision 4, Draft OP 618-4, 
May 1982) 
Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Exposure 
ALARA, Revision 1 -R, September 1975 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 GENERAL 
The approach to radiological design work is based upon the logical use of first principles in 
a systematic manner in order to obtain reasonable results. Radiation shielding design work 
is similarly structured such that a logical progression is made from simple models and 
calculations to more complicated models and sophisticated calculations. Shielding 
calculations are often initiated with simple hand calculations or simple computer codes in 
order to scope a shielding problem. In this manner, the problem may be bounded and thereby 
form the basis to progress to more complex models or calculations as warranted. Subsequent 
to any such calculation, a careful review by qualified personnel should be performed in order 
to determine the accuracy as well as adequacy of the information. Finally, ALARA 
evaluations will be required during the design process (Criteria 4.2.2) in order to obtain an 
optimal balance between shielding design and personnel protection. 
Although shielding calculations may typically contain several conservative assumptions, the 
results of such calculations should not be relied upon without subsequent confirmation for 
personnel safety. In typical applications, radiological surveys are performed for confirmation 
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of results in order to ensure such safety. If radiation conditions in. excess of calculations are 
determined from surveys, subsequent evaluation and re-analysis may then be performed in 
order to determine the source of such discrepancies and to evaluate other potential problems. 
Additionally, administrative controls may be imposed as needed in order to ensure personnel 
safety. 
5.2 COMPUTER CODES 
A variety of calculational methods and computer codes may be used for radiation -shielding 
analyses. In many cases, more than one is required in order to provide assurance that results 
are either reasonable or bounded. Whenever differences are noted between calculations, 
such differences must be documented and understood before proceedins. All shielding 
calculations must identify the assumptions used to model the geometry, the source 
characteristics, and comparison analysis. The documentation should reflect the definitive 
design detail available at the time the calculation is made. As design features change or 
become better defined, the calculations are updated to ensure conformance with the criteria 
or regulations. 
Radiation shielding computer codes used for quality affecting work are validated in 
accordance with Reference 7.2. This provides assurance that the software is used for its 
intended purpose, that the results are correct for the input provided, and that there is 
traceability for the products that result from the analysis. 
Codes qualified in this regard include the following: 
0 MCNP4A References 7.1 1.7.12 
hCICNP4A is a hghly versatile shielding and criticality code whch is able to perform 
both gamma as well as neutron shielding calculations. Both continuous-energy cross 
section data as well as multi-group approximations to cross-section data may be used 
in calculations. A Monte Carlo technique is used in the code to statistically sample 
a large number of particle histories through a simulated geometry. The code is best 
suited for simulating a complex geometry of arbitrary three dimensional 
configurations of materials using first and second degree surfaces. Both coherent and 
incoherent photon scattering is simulated both with and without electron binding 
effects as well as florescent emission following photoelectric absorption. Extensive 
use of various statistical tallies and biasing methods are available but are highly 
demanding upon the user for an advanced physics and mathematical training as well 
as an appreciation of the correct application and interpretation of results. 
Because of its versatility and capabilities, MCNP4A is the principal code for 
repository shielding design and analysis. This code will be used to evaluate the 
shielding configurations of the waste package and transporter, the in-drift concrete 
shadow shields, and personnel access in the main drift and turnout areas. 
0 MICROSHIELD Reference 7.13 
The code uses the point-kernel method for the solution of gamma shielding 
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calculations involving relatively simple geometries. The code contains a highly 
useful graphical display system for the generation of Lwo dimensional pictures of 
models as well as output in a number of different graphical displays. As with any 
point-kernel code, shielding calculations are limited in use for deep shielding types 
of geometries [more than 5 mean free paths] and for problems where scattered 
radiation may be an issue. 
MICROSHIELD is useful for relatively simple geometry and conceptual analysis 
where scattered radiation effects or where deep penetration may be neglected. 
Preliminary and final design will likely require the use of more sophisticated codes 
such as MCNPLFA, QAD-CGGP, and PATH. 
QAD-CGGP (single source) Reference 7.13 
The point-kernel line-of-sight QAD-CGGP code is used in cases where the 
configurations require a nonstandard setup. An example is the evaluation of 
penetrations and embedments upon the dose rate where scattering is not important. 
As with any point-kernel code, shielding calculations are limited in use for deep 
shielding types of geometries [more than 5 mean free paths] and for problems where 
scattered radiation may be an issue. 
A stand-alone version of QAD-CGGP has been qualified for quality affecting work. 
QAD-CGGP is also part of the SCALE 4.3; consequently qualification of SCALE 
4.3 will make QAD-CGGP available from this code group. 
a SCALE4.3 References 7.8,7.15,7.16 
SCALE 4.3 consists of a suite of computer codes which includes adaptations of the 
KENO, ORIGEN, MORSE, QAD-CGGP, as well as a number of support codes for 
the calculation of problem specific nuid group cross-sections, for heat transfer, and 
for graphical displays. The code was developed specifically to analyze shielding, 
criticality, and heat transfer problems associated with radioactive materials shipping 
casks. As with the MCNP code, extensive use of is made of various statistical tallies 
and biasing methods and are also highly demanding upon the usei for advanced 
physics and mathematical training as well as an appreciation of the correct 
application and interpretation of results. 
SCALE 4.3 is also useful for the generation of radiation source terms for repository 
shielding design and for quick check of other calculations. The 1-D and 3-D 
shielding modules of this code package may be used to verify calculations performed 
by other computer codes such as MCNP4A. 
PATH References 7.17,7.18 
The PATH shielding code is a highly flexible shielding code which uses the point- 
kernel integration technique for analyzing gamma radiation shielding. The major 
features include complex geometry modeling capabilities, multiple source options, 
and an extensive nuclear data library. The code is best suited for the following 
scoping applications: gamma dose rate calculations, determination of gamma shield 
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requirements from any radioactive components. As with any point-kernel code, the 
accuracy may be limited for deep penetration shielding geometries and to those 
applications where scattered radiation component is not important. 
5.3 ALARA 
The YMP ALARA program, Reference 7.19, refers to a design and operating philosophy 
which stands for “As Low As Reasonably Achievable,” in regard to keeping occupational 
radiation exposure not only below legal limits but as low as can reasonably be reached. 
The program is embodied in Reference 7.19 and is designed to meet the requirements of 
lOCFRl101, Radiation Protection Programs, which requires any licensee to “. . use, to the 
extent practicable, procedures, and engineering controls based on sound radiation 
protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that 
are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).” 
This Design Guide recommends the use of the ALARA program of Reference 7.19 at the 
earliest stages of the design process. It is through the use of ALARA early on that 
meaningful results may be achieved in the most cost effective manner. 
5.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 
Radiological design entails a number of complex issues and technologies. Ultimately, such 
designs may impact on the safety and welfare of workers and the public. Consequently, 
personnel involved with either design or checking should be highly qualified to perform 
such work. In the case of radiological shielding, personnel should as a minimum have 
graduate level college course work in radiation shielding or equivalent experience. 
Additionally, personnel should be qualified in the application of sophisticated shielding 
codes such as MCNP4A or SCALE 4.3 through the participation in training courses 
specifically designed for such use. [The latter are available through LANL and ORNL 
respectively .] 
6. PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION 
Verification is required for many design calculations in order to assure that the design meets 
the intended goals and criteria. This is especially appropriate for those design calculations 
where health and safety issues are involved. In the case of shielding design, the associated 
calculations are generally the product of many assumptions and modeling decisions which 
are at best, approximations to actual conditions. Consequently, shielding calculations are 
predictions, which in turn require comparisons with actual results in order to provide the 
appropriate level of safety confirmation. 
I 
Verification of shielding results may be accomplished by comparing calculated results with 
field data that is obtained under controlled conditions. Such controls may include 
confirmation testing using pseudo radiation sources or by the use of graduated approaches 
to final radiation conditions. The advantage of confirmation tests is that they enable 
comparisons between calculations and actual data before designed facilities are fully and 
irrevocably committed. 
1 
Such testing will likely be performed which will provide the opportunity to determine those 
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7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
7.6 
7.7 
7.8 
sources of design weakness. Refined shielding calculations will likely be required under 
such circumstances to determine the sources of error and to upgrade designs if required. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACD 
ALARA 
ANS 
ANSI 
B-poly 
B&W 
BWR 
CDA 
CDB 
CFR 
Ci 
CSCI 
DBF 
DCSS 
EBDRD 
EBS 
FA 
FSD or fsd 
GA 
GROA 
LEF 
LANL 
cc 
Advanced Conceptual Design 
As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
American Nuclear Society 
American National Standards Institute 
Borated polyethylene 
Babcock & Wilcox 
Boiling Water Reactor 
cubic centimeter 
Controlled Design Assumptions 
Characteristics Data Base 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Curies 
Computer Software Configuration Item 
Design Basis Fuel 
Design Concept Subsurface 
Engineered Barrier Design Requirements Document 
Engineered Barrier Segment 
Fuel Assembly 
Fractional Standard Deviation 
General Atomics 
Geologic Repository Operations Area 
Lower End Fittings 
Los Alamos National Lab 
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MeV 
MGDS 
MTMM 
MTU 
MWD 
dS 
NRC 
ORNL 
PC 
PWR 
QARD 
RDRD 
RG 
SFD 
SNF 
STP 
TBD 
TBV 
TEDE 
TN 
UEF 
Millions of electron Volts 
Mined Geologic Disposal System 
Metric Tons of Initial Heavy Metal 
Metric Tons of Uranium (same as MTMM) 
Megawatt Days 
Neutrons per second 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Personal Computer 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Quality Assurance Requirements Document 
Repository Design Requirements Document 
Regulatory Guide 
Spent Fuel Disassembly 
Spent Nuclear Fuel 
South Texas Project 
To Be Determined 
To Be Verified 
Total Effective Dose Equivalent 
Transnuclear 
Upper End Fittings 
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ATTACHMENT I 
Page 1-1 of 1-2 
DESIGN BASIS FUEL 
PWR ACD DBF Neutron Source Data 
For PWR spent nuclear fuel, the neutron source strength is taken directly from the CDB. Since 
the neutron source spectrum is unavailable in the CDB, the neutron spectral data provided in the 
GA-4 spent fuel transportation cask design (Ref. 7.20) is used for this design analysis. The 
neutron source data for PWR ACD DBF are presented below: 
Neutron Source Strength 
6.740E+8 n/s per MTIHM (part of computer output from Ref. 7.6) 
Neutron Source SDectrum 
Neutron Energy 
Range (MeV) 
6.43-20.0 
3.00-6.43 
1.85-3.00 
1.40-1.85 
0.90- 1.40 
0.40-0.90 
0.10-0.40 
0.00-0.10 
Total 
Unnormalized 
S Dec truma 
2.3 54E+05' 
2.69 1 E+06 
3.002E+06 
1.680E+06 
2.265E+06 
2.466E+06 
4.827E+05 
0.0 
1.282E+07 
Normalized 
Spectrumb 
0.0 183 
0.2099 
0.2341 
0.1310 
0.1767 
0.1924 
0.0376 
0.0 
1 .o 
Unnormalized spectrum from Ref. 7.6, p. 5.2-6 for 35,000 Pc/TWdfMTIHAM burnup and 
10 yr decay. At 10 yr decay, the neutron spectrum is insensitive to the burnup. 
Normalized to 1.0 (total) for input to the MCNP4A code. Example: The normalized 
spectrum for the 6.43 to 20.0 MeV group = (2.354E+05)/( 1.282E+07) = 0.0-183 
Read as 2.354~10'. 
These parameters are used to obtain the ACD DBF neutron source term per waste package. 
PWR ACD DBF Gamma Source Data 
The gamma source strength for the active fuel regions of PWR ACD DBF is obtained from the 
CDB. The CDB also provides the gamma source energy spectrum required for this design 
analysis as shown below: 
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ATTACHMENT I 
Page 1-2 of 1-2 
PWR ACD DBF Gamma Source Data (part of computer output from Ref. 7.6) 
LWR Radiological DATABASE 
PHOTONS REPORT 
REACTOR TYPE & BURNUP: 
ENRICWVENT: 4.20% 
DECAY TIME: 10 YEARS 
The data is shown in Photons per secondIMTMM 
PWR 48086 
ENERGY (MeV) PHO/SEC % TOTAL 
1.0OOE-02 2.728E+15 24.27% 
2.500E-02 5.787E+14 5.15% 
3.750E-02 7.125E+14 6.34% 
5.750E-02 5.396E+14 4.80% 
8.500E-02 3.229E+14 2.87% 
1.25OE-01 3.145E+14 2.80% 
2.250E-01 2.640E+14 2.35% 
3.750E-01 1.257E+14 1.12% 
5.750E-01 4.798E+15 42.69% 
8.500E-01 4.671E+14 4.16% 
1.250E+00 3.849E+14 3.42% 
1.750E+00 4.879E+12 0.04% 
2.250E+00 7.693E+10 0.00% 
2.750E+00 5.940E+09 0.00% 
3.500E+00 7.264E+08 0.00% 
5.000E+00 2.900E+07 0.00% 
7.000E+00 3.343E+06 0.00% 
9.500E+00 3.841E+05 0.00% 
TOTAL *1.124E+16 100.01%* 
_________-_--__-___-___________ ----- ------------------ 
*This value was obtained by interpolating TOTALS values from ORIGEN2 runs to the specific 
burnup/enrichment/age combination you specified. Percentages have been calculated from this 
interpolated value and may not add up to 100 percent in all cases. (This paragraph is part of the 
computer output from Ref. 7.6). 
These parameters are used to obtain the ACD DBF gamma source term per waste package. 
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. ATTACHMENT I1 
Page 11-1 of 11-2 
AVERAGE PWR SPENT FUEL SOURCE TERMS 
The average spent fuel source data are used in this analysis for ALARA dose assessment. 
Consistent with the assumption in Section 4.3.1.1, the following source data are obtained from 
the CDB for average PWR spent fuel (assumed to be 26 years old with 39750 MWdIMTIHM 
burnup and 3.72 wt. % enrichment): 
Neutron Source Data 
2.241E+08 n/s  per MTU (Ref. 7.6, computer output) 
Gamma Source Data 
Reproduced on next page from Ref. 7.6, computer output. 
These parameters are used for ALARA evaluations. 
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LWR Radiological DATABASE 
PHOTONS REPORT 
REACTOR TYPE & BURNUP: PWR 39750 
ENRICHMENT: 3.72% 
DECAY TIME: 26 YEARS 
The data is shown in Photons per second/MTMM 
ENERGY (MeV) PHO/SEC 9i TOTAL 
1.000E-02 1.503E+15 27.16% 
2.500E-02 2.981E+14 5.39% 
3.750E-02 3.599E+14 6.50% 
5.750E-02 3.247Ec14 5.87% 
8.500E-02 1.633E+14 2.95% 
1.250E-01 1.274E+14 2.30% 
2.250E-01 1.375E+14 2.48% 
3.750E-01 5.727E+13 1.03% 
5.750E-01 2.469E+15 44.61% 
8.500E-01 3.741E+13 0.68% 
1.250E+00 5.668E+13 1.02% 
1.750E+00 1.140E+12 0.02% 
2.250E+00 1.763E+08 0.00% 
2.750E+00 5.487E+08 0.00% 
3.500E+00 2.209E+07 0 . O O %  
5 . 0 0 0 E + 0 0  9.470E+06 0.00% 
7.0r303+00 1.091E+06 0.00% 
9.500E+00 1.253E+05 0.00% 
................................ ................................ 
TOTAL *5.535E+15 100.01%* 
*This value was obtained by interpolating TOTALS values from ORIGENZ runs to the specific 
burnup/enrichment/decay time combination you specified. Percentages have been calculated 
from this interpolated value and may not add up to 100 percent in all cases. (This paragraph is 
part of the computer output from (Ref. 7.5) 
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